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Abstract
Objectives When it comes to interviewing suspected terrorists, global evidence points to
harsh interrogation procedures, despite the likelihood of false positives. How can the state
maintain an effective counterterrorism policy while simultaneously protecting civil rights?
Until now, the shroud of secrecy of “national security” practices has thwarted attempts by
researchers to test apparatuses that engender fair interrogation procedures. The present
study aims to test one approach: the use of a “procedural justice checklist” (PJ Checklist) in
interviews of suspected terrorists by counterterrorism police officers in port settings.
Methods Using a clustered randomized controlled field test in a European democracy,
we measure the effect of implementing Procedural Justice (PJ) Checklists in counter-
terrorism police settings. With 65 teams of officers randomly-assigned into treatment
and control conditions, we compare post-interrogation surveys of suspects (n = 1418)
on perceptions of legitimacy; obligations to obey the law; willingness to cooperate with
the police; effectiveness of counterterrorism measures; distributive justice; feelings of
social resistance to the state; and PJ. A series of multi-level linear, logistic, and ordered
logit regression models are used to estimate the treatment effect, with Hedges’ g and
odds ratios used for effect sizes.
Results When compared with control conditions, implementing a policy of PJ Checklist
causes statistically significant and large enhancement in all measured dimensions, includ-
ing the willingness of suspects to obey the law (g = 1.022 [0.905, 1.138]), to cooperate
with the police (g = 1.118 [0.999, 1.238]), distributive justice (g = 0.993 [0.880, 1.106]),
effectiveness (g = 1.077 [0.959, 1.195]), procedural justice (g = 1.044 [0.930, 1.158]), and
feelings of resistance towards the state (g = − 0.370 [− 0.259, − 0.482]).
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Conclusions PJ checklists offer a simple, scalable means of improving how state
agents interact with terrorism suspects. The police can use what is evidently a
cost-effective tool to enhance legitimacy and cooperation with the police, even
in a counterterrorism environment.
Keywords Procedural justice checklist . Randomised controlled trial . Scalable
interventions . Counterterrorism . Legitimacy
If asked “How should society treat terrorists?”, most people would argue for a
more punitive response (Hood and Hoyle 2015). Some citizens are not upset when
security forces do “whatever it takes” to protect them from the threat of terrorism,
even if using “extreme measures” implies or creates violations of human rights
(Kugler and Cooper 2010). In these scenarios, political violence and the defense
of civil liberties come into conflict, leading to serious ethical and psychological
discord (Merin et al. 2015).
Every human being deserves to be treated with dignity and respect, but this seems
especially to be the case when the culpability of the suspect has yet to be demonstrated
(Europol 2017; Newheiser and DeMarco 2018). After all, suspects might simply be
innocent civilians, and the initial suspicion may have been erroneous. Treating people
who did not commit any crime unfairly is a major concern, as doing so can lead to
reduced belief in the legitimacy of the law, by the general public, those suspected of
terrorism, or both (LaFree 2018). It may also alienate the group to which the suspected
terrorist belongs, which could backfire when asking for help to counter terrorism—the
most troublesome manifestation of this being that somemay be driven to extremism as a
reaction to the harsh counterterrorism approach against their community (Cronin 2006).
Despite these concerns, there is global evidence that suspected terrorists are likely to
be treated unfairly in the name of national security interests (Guiora 2006; Piazza and
Walsh 2010). Wherever we find actual or perceived terrorism threats, we see evidence
of repressive strategies (Dreher et al. 2010). Common features of counterterrorism
policy include “aggressive interrogation techniques,” procedural impropriety, and ne-
glect of fundamental rights and liberties (Lindekilde and Sedgwick 2012), even in
societies with a longstanding tradition of protecting human rights (Bayley and
Weisburd 2009; Steyn 2004).
What can be done to improve the ways in which state actors interact with suspected
terrorists? At the very least, how can we improve the conduct of security enforcement
agencies when they interview suspected terrorists? This is not an easy task, as much of
the work of these agencies remains “in the shadows,” often out of reach to researchers.
The public usually learns about supposed adverse interrogation room tactics and the
removal of due process rights on an ad hoc basis (Shane 2009). Likewise, researchers
have found it challenging to access the world of counterterrorism; as a result, the
amount of evidence-based interventions is limited (Lum et al. 2006). Consequently, we
encounter a paradox: public safety situations in which greater certainty about a
strategy’s effectiveness could prove beneficial are precisely the situations in which
evidence is scarce. As such, social scientists are rarely in a position to make evidence-
based policy recommendations that might shape how security services respond to
individuals suspected of terrorism (Ajzenstadt and Ariel 2008).
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In this study, we present the results of the first national test of one type of
intervention: a prospective experiment in which counterterrorism officers were tasked
with applying a procedural justice checklist during their engagement with suspected
terrorists. This checklist is similar to those that have been applied by pilots, surgeons,
and NASA astronauts (see Gawande 2009). This reminder to comply with a rigid “code
of practice” meant providing suspects with information about their arrest, allowing
them to voice their concerns, and treating them impartially. The checklist was hypoth-
esized to alter how suspects perceive interactions with counterterrorism officers across
multiple dimensions, as well as their overall approval of policing.
What do we know about the treatment of suspected terrorists?
Research evidence shows that most people experience “morality silence”when asked how
to respond to individuals suspected of terrorism (Kugler and Cooper 2010), i.e., a tendency
to look the other way when the procedural rights of “enemies” are denied. These rights—
ranging from freedom from torture, to having reasonable access to legal aid through pre-
trial arrests or preventative detention, to respectful treatment by law enforcement
officers—are commonly subverted worldwide (Kreps 2014). This moral and procedural
ambivalence is most stark when it comes to the treatment of suspected and convicted
terrorists (Gronke et al. 2010; Hewitt 1990). The greater people’s sense of insecurity, the
lower their support for civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004; Viscusi and Zeckhauser
2003). Similarly, the indiscriminate violent acts perpetuated by terrorists severely provoke
us, often leading to greater support for a “tougher hand” (Randahl 2018).
Given the above, it is unsurprising that police and security services use the full
extent of legal measures to identify terrorists or gather intelligence about future terrorist
attacks (Bamford 2005; Darmer 2002; Godsey 2005; Gross 2001). Further, in the
context of an imminent attack, officials sometimes consider it justifiable to use more
extreme approaches (Brecher and Brecher 2007; Dershowitz 2002). However, it
becomes challenging to justify unusual techniques for the purpose of identifying a
suspected terrorist. There are three objections commonly made to doing so, which we
set out below.
First, applying tough or extreme measures is difficult to justify when the subject is
merely a suspect or (ultimately) innocent (Curzer 2006). Law enforcement officers, like
members of any profession, are fallible, and both clinical and actuarial assessments are
prone to false positives and false negatives (Jonas and Harper 2006; Spinney 2010;
Wainer and Savage 2008). Poor intelligence can lead to inaccurate identification of
alleged terrorists, sometimes in large numbers (Chang 2011; Gross 2004) and can
produce vast pools of “persons of interest” that present significant challenges for both
police and security services. Law enforcement agencies should therefore apply clear
codes of practice with regard to the fair treatment of suspects (Dotan 2004; Perito and
Parvez 2014). A strong supporting argument for this practice is utilitarian: the more
often that extreme measures are applied on false positives (i.e., arresting many but
uninvolved members of the community), the less likely that community will be to
support or assist with counterterrorism efforts (Hasisi et al. 2009).
Second, obtaining information under duress or via manipulation or illegitimate
means often leads to false information (Malloy et al. 2014; Sangero 2016). Following
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up on such leads means that actual terrorists remain at large and can continue carrying
out attacks (Ginbar 2008). It is entirely conceivable that suspects will provide false
information about themselves, or implicate the wrong persons, just “to give up some
names”, only as a way to stop the aggressive interrogation from continuing. Such false
confessions and erroneous intelligence can hinder the investigation.
Third, there is a fundamental issue here: suspects should be treated professionally,
respectfully, and without prejudice or bias (Grant 2007; Hirose 2014; Tankebe 2013;
Watson 2019). Even if we assume that punishment for terrorism should be severe, the
central rule in most democracy-based legal systems is that suspects should be treated
fairly, no matter how heinous the crime of which they are suspected (McCrudden
2008). Until proven otherwise, the underlying assumption of law enforcement agencies
must be that the suspect is innocent (Dotan 1999). We expect police and security
services to handle such persons with respect and to accord them fundamental human
rights (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004; Tyler and Wakslak 2004).
However, despite agreement about the need to treat suspects and the accusedwith respect
(Obama 2010; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2008;
Tyler 2012), the practice can fall far short of this aim. Evidence collected around the globe
suggests that suspected terrorists are often treated disrespectfully or worse (Bonner 2013;
Amnesty International 2017; Leslie 2017). Different ethnic, religious, or racial groups report
in surveys that they experience discrimination, bias, and unfair treatment and are viewed as a
security threat (Perry and Jonathan-Zamir 2014). Interestingly, the same groups of respon-
dents often express strong and positive attitudes towards cooperating with the police and
report terrorist threats to authorities (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011).
What can be done to minimize the risk of improper conduct
during initial interviews?
Scholars interested in changing these practices highlight the need for training
(Williamson 2013), better recruitment processes (Perliger et al. 2009), increased legal
oversight (Guiora 2005), videotaping interrogations (Drizin and Colgan 2000; Hyatt
et al. 2017), and conducting public inquiries (Rehman 2007). However, there is a
limited number of rigorous evaluations of counterterrorism strategies, and virtually
none concerning matters that take place during interviews. A systematic review of
counterterrorism interventions detected only seven studies that used at least moderately
rigorous scientific methods (Lum et al. 2006). The shroud of secrecy that characterizes
counterterrorism strategies limits access to field settings and data, let alone carefully
controlled tests of tactics (Langley 2014). We know of no randomized controlled trials
that have attempted to modify the behavior of interviewers and detectives as they
interact with suspected terrorists.
One recent approach that has been suggested as a tool for changing how policing
practice is conducted is “procedural justice” (Tyler 2006). This term refers to percep-
tions of the fairness of processes that police officers—or, more broadly, legal
authorities—use when they interact with citizens (Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz 2018).
Surveys in various countries have shown that, in forming their views about the
legitimacy of police authority, citizens sometimes focus more heavily on the quality
of their interactions with the police and much less on the outcomes received from the
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police (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2006; Tyler et al. 2010). If citizens feel as
though they were treated with dignity and respect and if they perceive the officer’s
decision as fair, they will trust the officer’s decision (Tyler and Bies 1990) and feel a
greater obligation to obey the law (Tyler and Wakslak 2004). Furthermore, research on
police–citizen contacts involving the use of procedural justice shows a link to enhanced
quality of police–citizen interactions, with citizens reporting greater satisfaction with
the interaction (Mastrofski et al. 1996; McCluskey 2003; Reiss 1971; Reiss and
Farrington 1991; Tyler and Fagan 2008), willingness to comply with police directives
(Tyler and Bies 1990), and willingness to cooperate with the police (Murphy et al.
2008; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Tankebe 2013).
Procedural justice can be contextualized more broadly within legitimacy theory.
Legitimacy in law enforcement refers to the moral right of the state and its actors to
govern. As such, it is multidimensional (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012). In the context of
counterterrorism interviews, this intricacy is even more pronounced. If the police inves-
tigation should be viewed as “legitimate,” for whichever purpose, then we would require
the police officer to behave lawfully, to apply fair procedures when dealing with people,
and to produce outcomes that are equally distributed between individuals of different
backgrounds, but also to be effective in its mission (see review in Ariel et al. 2020).
A crucial gap in the literature is methodological: The majority of evidence on proce-
dural justice and legitimacy is observational in design (Murphy et al. 2008; Tyler et al.
2014). A small number of studies applied randomized controlled trial methodologies to
assess the effects of police behavior on legitimacy outcomes. These include the Queens-
land Community Engagement Trial in Australia (Mazerolle et al. 2013a) and the Scotland
Community Engagement Trial (MacQueen and Bradford 2015), which involved use of
“procedural justice scripts” by officers conducting breath-testing at roadblocks. The
Australian experiment indicated that the procedurally just traffic stops improved the
citizens’ perceptions of both the individual officer and the entire police department
(Mazerolle et al., 2013). Notably, however, in the Scotland study, citizens’ perceptions
of police legitimacy diminished with procedurally just police contact (MacQueen and
Bradford 2015; but cf. MacQueen and Bradford 2017).
Similarly, Ariel et al. (2020) and Demir et al. (2018) used body-worn cameras to
increase the application of procedural justice by traffic officers in Uruguay and Turkey,
respectively. In the Uruguay study (Ariel et al. 2020; see also Mitchell et al. 2018),
drivers who interacted with officers using body-worn cameras were more likely to
report that they were listened to before the officers made decisions about their case,
were treated with respect, and felt that officers expressed sincere concern for their well-
being. They were also more likely to say that the traffic officers demonstrated neutrality
in handling their cases. Collectively, the studies indicated significant improvements
across various dimensions of legitimacy when officers using body-worn cameras issued
tickets to traffic violators; importantly, these enhancements were linked to increases in
perceived procedural justice, compared to control conditions (see Ariel et al. 2020).
How can procedural justice be increased during police interviews?
Making abstract concepts like “fairness,” “legitimacy,” “respect,” and “fair treatment”
actionable and measurable has been challenging. We know that samples of Muslims in
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New York City (Tyler et al. 2010) and London (Huq et al. 2011), Arab Israelis in Israel
(Hasisi and Weisburd 2011; Perry and Hasisi 2018), and passengers in U.S. airports
(Lum et al. 2015; Sindhav et al. 2006) are concerned about procedural justice when it
comes to counterterrorism. However, how to operationalize these concepts is unclear.
The change is not necessarily legal, because in most democracies the lawfulness of
counterterrorism is not as much a concern as its practice—i.e., black letter laws often
prohibit disrespectful and unfair treatment of citizens (Clayton et al. 2000). In fact, a
review of standard operating guidelines in law enforcement agencies worldwide shows
that the manuals are, prima facie, within the rule of law—i.e., fair and unbiased—and
the issue has always been in the application of these concepts (Schmid 2013).
Furthermore, the evidence regarding what works to increase the use of procedural
justice in policing is limited and often mixed. Research tends to show an initial effect of
police training, but this effect decays over time (Antrobus et al. 2018; Murphy et al.
2014). Enhanced oversight to increase the use of procedural justice is promising (Hyatt
et al. 2017), though not without a potentially negative effect on the motivation and
productivity of police officers (Wallace et al. 2018; Ariel et al. 2020).
Borrowing from the well-known work of Gawande (2009), we propose a different
approach: using a checklist to remind officers of their code of practice during inter-
views with the intention of improving procedural compliance. Trials in various profes-
sions that implemented a checklist policy have shown an increase in compliance with
rules and procedures on critical issues (Hales and Pronovost 2006; Weiser et al. 2010).
Pilots (Degani and Wiener 1993), surgeons (Treadwell et al. 2014), astronauts
(Marshburn et al. 2003), and physicians (Huis et al. 2012) were asked to use checklists
to increase cooperation with specialized yet critical guidelines, and the results were
similar: enhanced services and professional delivery of outcomes.
If checklists are useful in promoting health and safety, could they also be used to
remind officers to be courteous, fair, and unbiased towards citizens in high-stakes
interviews? Some evidence suggests that different forms of reminders are effective
compared with no-reminder conditions (Langley 2014; Mazerolle et al. 2013a; Mitchell
et al. 2018; Sahin et al. 2017). However, whether a checklist will successfully increase
the fair and just treatment of suspected terrorists is presently unknown.
Methods
Field experiments in policing are still relatively rare, and controlled tests on
counterterrorism are even rarer (Lum et al. 2006). We found no published trials
applying more just or fair counterterrorism or counter-extremism processes. We
were particularly interested in studies of counterterrorism powers that allow the
police to operate with broad and intrusive powers to stop, search, and hold
individuals suspected of being terrorists, as these powers are at the heart of
potential human rights violations (Heath-Kelly 2012; Moran 2005). These laws
provide security services with the discretion to stop, interview, or investigate
individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism without the need for the same
level of grounds required for “ordinary crimes” (see more broadly Ajzenstadt and
Ariel 2008). However, we found no record of field evaluation with randomized
controlled tests of these policies and practices.
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Despite the lack of rigorous evaluations, in many countries, the use of such special
policing powers is high at points of entry into a country, whether by sea, air, or land
(hereinafter, “ports”). Counterterrorism officers are given the authority to detain and
question any person, search them and their belongings, and take biometric information
from them, usually without having to ask for permission. Further, it is an offense to
remain silent in these interviews, and those being detained at the port have no right to a
lawyer. These special powers apply when counterterrorism officers search for specific
individuals based on certain intelligence upon the request of the security services (local
or abroad). For example, the intelligence community might be aware of a suspected
terrorist traveling between countries and alert the counterterrorism officers that a
subject of interest is arriving. This has been the case with ISIS fighters who spent time
in Syria and Iraq and are now returning to their home countries (Byman 2015). More
broadly, the fact that some terrorists travel intercontinentally suggests that spatial
clustering is modus operandi-specific (see Hasisi et al. 2019), indicating a wider range
of terrorism threats and responses.
These powers to detain, intercept, or arrest can also be applied based on actuarial
predictions and behavioral detection tactics, although these are likely to produce
false positives (Mueller and Stewart 2016; Stewart and Mueller 2013). This is
because identifying a person as a suspect at a port based on body language or
overall demeanor and appearance is very difficult (Rae 2012). The likelihood of
falsely identifying an innocent person as a suspected terrorist is thus very high in
such settings. Take the United Kingdom as an example: The special powers to
detain and question passengers in ports are found in Schedule 7 of the England and
Wales Terrorism Act 2000 (‘Schedule 7’), which is a national security port and
border power that enables examining officers to stop, search, question and detain
any individual traveling through a port. According to published information by the
Home Office, 69,109 people were stopped and examined in 2011 and 2012 under
Schedule 7 powers, of whom 681 were then detained. If one takes detention as a
mark of success, the true positive rate is 0.0099% (Office for Security and Counter-
Terrorism 2012). Given the seemingly small chance of apprehending a suspected
terrorist without prior intelligence, and the likely high false positive rate, it seems
that U.K. counterterrorism officers ought to treat people with whom they interact
courteously, fairly, and respectfully, as they are likely to be innocent passengers
rather than terrorists.
Study design
In the areas of counterterrorism, anti-extremism, counterinsurgency, and civil unrest,
there are no rigorous evaluations using random allocation of treatments; see the debate
over the use of these designs in counterterrorism in Laycock (2012) and Lum and
Kennedy (2012), as well as Lum et al. (2006, p. 510–512). Other designs in this area
are asymptotically able to infer causality like randomized controlled trials—see, e.g.,
agent-based modeling (Andrighetto et al. 2019). However, the present study conditions
lent themselves to a controlled test of the effect of procedural justice on various
outcomes associated with legitimacy. As detailed herein, the random allocation of units
was both feasible and ethical, and the assumptions of randomized experiments were
met—for example, having a sufficiently large sample size, controlling for self-selection
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biases, maintaining treatment integrity, avoiding crossover contamination, and the
availability of valid and reliable measurable outcomes (see review in West 2009).
This study was designed as a cluster-randomized controlled field trial to estimate the
effect of a procedural justice checklist (PJ Checklist) on multiple outcomes compared
with controlled conditions. We collaborated with 21 ports in this European democracy
in which 65 teams were the units of randomization (hence the cluster component). We
applied PJ Checklists in about half of the teams, while control teams proceeded with
“business as usual.” There was no spillover of cases, officers, or spatiotemporal
interactions between the treatment and control teams. All officers in these clusters took
part in the experiment (either as control or treatment), with no exclusions.
Settings
The experiment was initiated by the research team, who contacted the country’s
relevant counterterrorism authorities with a request to conduct the study. The 21 ports
in this European democracy participated in a 12-month experiment beginning in
March 2016, following a request sent to all sea, air, or land ports across the nation
(over 100 in total). The approach to the ports with an invitation to participate was made
by the country’s national counterterrorism headquarters.
Table 1 shows the pre-intervention comparability of participating teams and ports.
None of the pre-intervention comparisons suggests a difference between clusters,
meaning that randomization appears to have been successful in creating comparable
(“balanced”) treatment and control groups.
The study was conducted in sea, train, and international ports that handled approx-
imately 1.5 billion passengers during the year prior to the experiment. The 65 teams
were comprised of 451 counterterrorism officers who conducted thousands of inter-
views per year, based on intelligence from counterterrorism agencies and a range of
counterterrorism investigation tactics, including behavioral profiling (Dowden et al.
2007; Fox and Farrington 2018). Counterterrorism officers monitor passenger move-
ments and operate searches in cordons in embarkations and disembarkation areas.
Table 1 Comparing participating treatment and control clusters (baseline)
Control
cluster participants
Treatment
cluster participants
Number of clusters (teams) 31 34
Clusters per port type:
Air 22 24
Sea 7 9
Train 2 1
Number of counterterrorism officers 224 227
Mean number of counterterrorism officers per team (SD) 7.22 (3.70) 6.67 (2.47)
Mean number of port terminals per port (SD) 2.03 (1.22) 2.17 (1.36)
Mean number of yearly passengers (in millions) (SD) 24.17 (28.62) 23.87 (29.11)
Mean number of stops per annum per cluster (SD) 1843.14 (1554.27) 1822.33 (1530.52)
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These teams, along with security services, are principally responsible for the exercise of
counterterrorism powers. To emphasize, these police officers make no other contact
with citizens other than dealing directly with suspected terrorist and extremist threats.
Population
Our population consisted of clusters of counterterrorism officers (i.e., teams) who stop
and search people suspected of involvement in the commission, preparation, or insti-
gation of acts of terrorism. During the experimental period, 1418 subjects of interest
underwent counterterrorism procedures at the participating ports and were included in
the study (23.6 subjects per each treatment cluster and 19.8 subjects per control cluster;
χ2 = .365, p < .10). Key demographic indicators of the suspects are listed in Table 2.
None of the baseline comparisons yielded any clinically significant difference. Running
Table 2 Comparing characteristics of treatment and control cluster suspects interviewed
Control cluster suspects Treatment cluster suspects
Number of respondents 615 803
Port type
Air 51.7% 49.4%
Sea 44.4% 47.3%
Train 3.9% 3.2%
Year of birth (mode) 1983 1982
% male 85.5% 85.8%
% in a relationship 53.5% 52.6%
% with bachelor’s degree or higher 31.6% 33.8%
% foreign national 33.7% 37.4%
Self-reported race/ethnicity
Arab 14.0% 14.0%
Pakistani 14.0% 11.0%
African 4.9% 5.2%
Eastern European 1.3% 2.9%
Indian 1.1% 1.0%
White 21.1% 20.8%
White Irish 14.3% 13.8%
% non-native language 35.3% 37.9%
% follow any religion 63.4% 65.9%
% Christian 28.6% 32.3%
% Muslim 36.8% 35.4%
% reason for travel: business 43.6% 39.0%
% reason for travel: family visit 24.9% 23.8%
% reason for travel: not given 10.9% 12.3%
% first time stopped at the port by police 49.4% 54.6%
% stopped previously by police for any other matter 37.6% 36.2%
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statistical significance testing for measurement of baseline differences in randomized
controlled trials is not a recommended practice (see de Boer et al. 2015; Harvey 2018;
Mills et al. 2019; Moher et al. 2012; Senn 1995).
Random allocation
Randomization was carried out by the research team, not the treatment delivery
team. We used simple random assignment using the Cambridge Randomizer (Ariel
et al. 2012). Teams within ports were the unit of allocation, with outcomes collected
at the level of suspect interviews, clustered within teams. When randomizing teams
within ports, one concern was violation of the stable unit treatment value assump-
tion (SUTVA): “non-interference” between units, otherwise described as the
outcome of one unit not depending on the outcome of any other unit (see Shadish
et al. 2002).
When there is “interference,” treatment effects may be attenuated, meaning that the
true impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable is masked to some
degree (Ariel et al. 2018). All previous experiments on procedural justice, for example,
suffered from this problem, which complicates causal inference (Nagin and Sampson
2018). To counter this risk, we randomly assigned entire officer teams in a cluster
randomized controlled trial design (Raudenbush 1997). Treatment teams were separat-
ed from the control counterterrorism officer teams. Moreover, teams did not engage
with one another, did not work on the same cases, had their own assigned line
managers, and did not work at the same location as other teams. As such, likelihood
of contamination is reduced.
Instrument and the experimental procedure
As reviewed earlier, the literature identifies four dimensions that express “procedural
justice” in any interaction between police and the public (Gau 2014; Jonathan-Zamir
et al. 2015; Tyler and Wakslak 2004):
1. a citizen’s participation in the proceedings prior to an authority reaching a decision
(“voice”);
2. neutrality of the authority in its decision;
3. whether the authority showed dignity and respect throughout the interaction; and
4. trustworthy motives.
We used one instrument—the PJ Checklist—to operationalize these four dimensions by
converting the items into a checklist format (see Supplementary Materials A). Each
item corresponded to one of these four elements of procedural justice, and we used
multiple items for each dimension in order to improve the likelihood that the construct
would in fact be implemented.
The same procedure was mandated in all ports. Before the experiment, the research
team communicated with each cluster (i.e., team) and explained to all supervisors the
purpose of the experiment and the procedures that were agreed upon with the counter-
terrorism headquarters (we did not experience any resistance from the local managers).
We then met with all the treatment cluster officers, explained the provided guidance on
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the PJ Checklist and the rationale behind this project, and consulted with them on the
feasibility of the experimental procedures. Modifications were therefore incorporated
into the process prior to random assignment. The focus of these meetings was to obtain
“buy-in” from the field counterterrorism officers, particularly about the potential
benefits of using procedural justice in terms of increasing the perceived legitimacy of
the passengers who undergo these interviews.
When counterterrorism officers profiled passengers as potential suspects (based on
intelligence briefs or other investigative means), they would ask the suspect to accom-
pany them to an interview room, where the suspect would be questioned with the goal
of eliciting information from them. The counterterrorism guidelines in this country
dictate that suspects are to be told explicitly that they are being screened for security
reasons (as opposed to the possibility of being in possession of contraband, for
example). As the process commenced, officers notified their duty supervisor and
operations coordinator; the operations coordinators then registered the case on the data
portal. The research team audited all case reference numbers against duty logs and
found that all cases were delivered as assigned and that no registered case was excluded
after treatment delivery.
We distributed paper copies of the PJ Checklists to the counterterrorism officers to
use during their interactions with suspects. The implementation of the apparatus was
mandated and managed by a local supervising officer in every treatment team; how-
ever, supervisors’ presence in interviews varied across teams, ranging between 9% and
75% of interviews, with a 31% average presence across all teams. Every interaction
was recorded, and a supervisor then signed off on the PJ Checklist completed by the
officers. Subsequently, a PJ Checklist policy was applied to all of the treatment
subjects, and no PJ Checklists were applied in control conditions (as these teams did
not take part in the experimental procedure). We are unable to verify the implementa-
tion of the PJ Checklists beyond these self-reported cards and the validations of the line
managers. We were not granted access to the interview room and/or any recordings
made by the counterterrorism officers; the PJ Checklist formed part of the interview
dossier, and we also therefore did not gain access to each PJ Checklist. We discuss this
limitation below.
A senior national project led by the country’s national counterterrorism headquarters
was appointed to serve as the organizational interface with the research team and
provide organizational support for the project. In addition, given the distance between
the different ports nationwide, we employed local project managers who were vetted to
scrutinize and collect data. Their task included creating workable databases that
contemporaneously recorded each case that went through the experimental pipeline.
At the end of each interview (both under treatment and control conditions),
subjects were handed an envelope by the leading counterterrorism officer, in which
was included an invitation to complete a research survey (which had been translated
into 11 languages through a professional translation company, including back-
translation). As shown in Supplementary Materials B, the survey did not form part
of the police interview, and the police officer was not asked to stay with the subjects
while they completed the survey. The invitation was always made after the inter-
view was concluded, and per the University of Cambridge’s ethical guidelines,
consent was requested from all participants prior to the participation in the study;
the completion of the survey was voluntary. Once the participant filled out the
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survey, they were asked to place the completed survey in a sealed envelope. The
duty supervisor collected the sealed envelopes and sent all the surveys to the
research team every 2 weeks. The research team then coded the data into Excel
for analysis purposes. Over 12 months, 10,225 passengers were suspected of
involvement in terrorism and interacted with the counterterrorism officers in the
participating ports; of those, 1418 eligible subjects consented to complete the
survey—a common level of response rate to surveys in the field of procedural
justice research. For example, for mail surveys, Mazerolle et al. (2013a) and
Sunshine and Tyler (2003) reported response rates of 15% and 22%, respectively;
for telephone surveys, Skogan (2006), Hasisi and Weisburd (2014), Jonathan-Zamir
et al. (2016), and Tyler (2006) reported response rates of 35%, 40%, 58%, and 63%,
respectively. We found no clinically significant differences between responders and
non-responders: The percentage of respondents who are not citizens of this Euro-
pean Democracy in the respondent and non-respondent groups were 41% and 45%,
respectively; 19% versus 18% White suspects, respectively; and the mode year of
birth was 1982 (SD = 13.1 years) and 1979 (SD = 10.6 years), respectively.
Treatment conditions
During every interrogation, the counterterrorism officer was required to use the PJ
Checklist and tick the boxes as they went through the encounter. At the end of the
interview, regardless of outcome (detention, arrest, or release), the officer gave the
completed PJ Checklist to the duty supervisor, who would then deliver it to the
research team.
Control conditions
Control teams applied a “business as usual” approach. This meant that interviews were
conducted as they normally would be, without using the PJ Checklist. However, every
counterterrorism encounter was recorded by the operations coordinator, and data about
the encounter were recorded on the case portal.
Measures
We collected data for several dimensions. The measures were perceptions of distribu-
tive justice, effectiveness, obligation to obey the law, willingness to co-operate, and
social resistance (for the latter, see Factor et al. 2011, 2013). We collected and report
these separately because there is no agreement in the police legitimacy literature on the
status of these variables. For example, some scholars operationalize legitimacy as the
feeling of obligation the law (Tyler and Fagan 2008), while others view legitimacy as a
multidimensional concept, comprising procedural justice, distributive justice, effective-
ness and lawfulness (Tankebe 2013 Bottoms and Tankebe 2012). The present exper-
iment does not attempt to “settle the score.” Instead, we provide treatment versus
control comparisons across multiple measures, as all outcomes are potentially of
interest to scholars in this field. Because the relevant theories all hypothesize outcomes
in the same direction—improved perceptions of both the specific experience with the
counterterrorism officers and global perceptions about counterterrorism and the law
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more broadly—the fundamental question then becomes one of magnitude, which we
address in the analytical plan below. Overall, six outcome measures were used (but not
combined, as they are likely to represent discrete theoretical dimensions).
Distributive justice This variable refers to the fairness of the outcome a person receives
in comparison with what others receive (Bottoms and Tankebe 2017). We used four
Likert-type items to address this dimension—“The police treated me the same way any
other person would have been treated” (Sahin et al. 2017)—on a scale of 1 (“strongly
disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). The higher the score, the greater the perception of
distributive justice. The responses for the items were internally consistent (α = .91).
Effectiveness This dimension captures participants’ feelings of effectiveness of coun-
terterrorism, measured using multiple items with a Likert-type scale of 1 (“strongly
disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”): “The police are too soft on terrorism” (flipped); “The
police are doing a good job in fighting terrorism.” The higher the score, the more
favorable the judgment of effectiveness. The collapsed dimension was sufficiently
reliable (α = .71).
Obligation to obey the law This measured participants’ sense of duty to obey the law.
Three items were used, with responses ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5
(“strongly agree”). These were combined to create an “obligation-to-obey-law” scale,
with a higher score reflecting a greater feeling of obligation (α = .96).
Willingness to co-operatewith the police This measured participants’ intentions to
support counterterrorism efforts through the supply of information to the police. Ten
questions were used. The response categories were on a scale of 1 to 4. The responses
were combined to create a willingness-to-cooperate scale (α = .98), with higher scores
reflecting a greater intention to cooperate with counterterrorism efforts.
Social resistance This framework offers an addition to the procedural justice model:
The notions of alienation and active social resistance that are central to the social
resistance framework may play a role in the link between perceptions of procedural
justice and non-compliance with the law or engagement in criminal behaviors (Factor
et al. 2013). Because of discrimination, members of non-dominant minority groups
may feel a lack of attachment to the country and alienation from the larger society. In
response, members of these groups may actively engage in counterterrorism, extrem-
ism, or other deviant behaviors. By engaging in such behaviors, members of such
groups express their willingness and ability to defy the country and the dominant
group. To operationalize this framework, we used several items scored on a 1–5 Likert
scale: (a) “I often find myself objecting to the symbols of my country (e.g. the flag, the
national anthem)”; (b) “I disagree with the values that my country represents”; (c)
“sometimes I am opposed to what my country represents”; (d) “it is okay for people
who are in a difficult situation to occasionally disobey the law”; (e) “sometimes I get so
frustrated I feel like damaging public property”; (f) “sometimes my economic and
social status makes me want to show others that I am angry”; and (g) “sometimes I get
so frustrated I feel like protesting to express my economic and social status.” The items
were internally consistent (Cronbach’s α = .87).
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Implementation check
While we are not able to ascertain the extent to which each item in the PJ Checklist
was completed, we are, however, in a position to conduct an implementation check
by measuring how participants experienced the independent variable—procedural
justice—using several questions on a Likert-type scale (see Supplementary
Materials B). Each PJ dimension included several items, which were all internally
consistent based on Cronbach’s alpha (voice (α = .98; (Mazerolle et al. 2012));
respect (α = .97; (Sahin et al. 2017)); trustworthiness (α = .98). Impartiality was
measured with a single “flipped” item, which is consistent with other research in
this area (Tankebe 2013). For each section of voice, respect, and trustworthiness,
higher scores indicate a more favorable perception of the interaction. We used these
scales to compare the treatment and control conditions on different dimensions of
procedural justice.
In addition, we incorporated specific questions about procedural effectiveness—i.e.,
the extent to which participants recalled the efficiency of the encounter. Specifically, we
asked (a) whether the counterterrorism officer introduced themselves, (b) whether the
counterterrorism officer explained what legislation was being used, and (c) the partic-
ipant’s perception of how long it took for the interaction to be completed.
Statistical procedures
Baseline balance First, baseline characteristics, collected at the time of commencing
the trial, were cross-tabulated according to the randomized cluster to assess balance and
to provide an overview of the study population, both at the cluster and suspect levels
(Tables 1 and 2).
Main outcomes We ran a series of linear, logistic, and ordered logit multilevel
regression models in Stata version 15.1 to estimate the treatment effect on the
dependent variables (Hox et al. 2017).1 The distribution of the outcome variables
dictated the type of model we applied (linear, logistic, or ordered logit). Table 3
reports the raw means and standard deviations by treatment group for each
outcome. As all analyses were multilevel models, this accounts for clustering of
suspects by location or team, but we also estimated models with robust standard
errors. We report exact p values or “< 0.001” where p values were given as
“0.000” in raw output. Where multiple outcome testing was undertaken—for
example, with procedural justice and subdomains—we report the p values and
1 As Wears (2002) commented, “any time there are multiple analytic options, there will be differences of
opinion among statisticians about which choice is best, although most will admit that previous familiarity with
a method plays a large role in their opinion. This uncertainty is compounded when there is not a “natural”
choice for the analytic unit.” (p. 337) We ruled out analyzing the data with the individual participants as the
unit of analysis, as many experimenters agree that the allocation unit should be the unit of analysis (Murray
1998).
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include a calculation for the adjusted threshold for statistical significance using the
conservative Bonferonni correction (see Abdi 2007; Sedgwick 2012).
To measure the magnitude of the differences between treatment and control
conditions, we used two statistics. First, to estimate standardized mean differences
and 95% confidence intervals, we used Hedges’ g, given the unequal cluster
sample sizes (Borenstein et al. 2011; Hedges 2007; Nakagawa and Cuthill
2007). The interpretation of Hedges’ g (Hedges 2007) is the same as Cohen’s d,
meaning these results can be compared with previous police legitimacy experi-
ments (Mazerolle et al. 2013b). We applied this statistic for all outcomes measured
in a scale format. Second, we used odds ratios for measures that observed binary
outcomes, specifically for the statements “[the] officer introduced himself” and
“[the] officer explained what legislation is used.”
Results
Main outcomes Table 3 lists the mean participant responses post-intervention across
multiple outcomes. There are noticeable differences between treatment and control
Table 3 Post-intervention treatment versus control comparison: mean participant responses and dimensions’
internal consistency
Dimensions/scalesa Control
N
Control
(SD)b
Treatment
N
Treatment
(SD)
Cronbach’s
alpha
Procedural justice 597 2.96 (1.53) 766 4.26 (0.97) .959
Impartiality/neutrality 603 3.05 (1.51) 772 4.19 (1.14) –c
Respect 597 2.97 (1.54) 766 4.26 (0.98) .968
Trustworthy motives 607 2.92 (1.62) 782 4.25 (1.08) .984
Voice 603 2.96 (1.58) 772 4.28 (1.00) .977
Officer introduced himselfd 572 47% 751 90% –c
Officer explained what
legislation is usedc, d
573 46.3% 760 89.5% –c
Perceived length of interrogatione 608 1.95 (1.15) 791 1.94 (1.27) –c
Distributive justice 603 2.98 (1.38) 772 4.13 (0.97) .914
Effectiveness of counterterrorism
policy
561 3.12 (1.23) 726 4.27 (0.91) .710
Obligation to obey the law 563 2.80 (1.43) 731 4.06 (1.07) .962
Cooperation with the police 550 2.33 (1.23) 712 3.48 (0.83) .984
Social resistance 561 2.04 (0.84) 726 1.73 (0.81) .867
a Scale 1–5, except for obligation to obey the law—scale 1–4
b SD = standard deviation
c single item
d Binary
e Scale of 1–5; 1–5 scale: (1) < 5 min; (2) 6–15 min; (3) 16–25 min; (4) 26–35 min; (5) 35+min
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clusters, all in the hypothesized direction: The application of a PJ Checklist led to
higher scores on the scales for procedural justice, distributive justice, effective-
ness, feelings of obligation to obey the law, willingness to cooperate with the
police, and lower scores for social resistance. The same pattern emerges for
specific items—procedural effectiveness and the various components of procedur-
al justice—when measured independently, where the treatment group expressed
more favorable views compared with the control group. For example, while over
90% of the treatment respondents reported that the counterterrorism officer intro-
duced themselves and explained what legislation was used to take the respondent
through a counterterrorism interrogation procedure, less than half of control
participants reported the same. Of further interest is the perception of time: There
were no differences between the treatment and control groups in terms of the
perceived length of the interaction with the police officers, which suggests that
applying a PJ Checklist does not result in the perception of a longer encounter.
These differences are supported by the statistical results shown in Table 4. Across
the board, the independent samples t tests are all highly significant (p ≤ .0001), and the
coefficients are statistically different between groups, with relatively small standard
errors. Table 4 further details the magnitude of these differences.
Distributive justice Treatment participants perceived the outcomes they received
in comparison with what others received as fairer than control participants (b =
1.072 [95% CI 0.818, 1.326]). The effect size was g = 0.993 (95% CI 0.880,
1.106).
Effectiveness This dimension captures participants’ feelings about the effectiveness of
counterterrorism policy. The findings suggest that treatment respondents did not
perceive the officers and police as less efficient (b = 1.046 [95% CI 0.821, 1.271]). A
similar magnitude of difference was detected for this outcome as for the other outcomes
(g = 1.077 [95% CI 0.959, 1.195]).
In terms of respondents’ willingness to co-operate with the counterterrorism
effort and their obligation to obey the law, large differences were reported between
groups (g = 1.022 [95% CI 0.905, 1.138] and g = 1.118 [95% CI 0.999, 1.238],
respectively). Read together with the group-level mean differences (Table 3),
while the mean score for the control group ranged from 56 to 58, the treatment
group’s mean scores range from 81 to 87 (on a scale of 1–100)—more than one
standard deviation apart.
Social resistance PJ Checklists reduced the expressed social resistance and willing-
ness of treatment participants to engage in criminal or deviant behavior compared
with control conditions (b = − 0.308 [95% CI − 0.519, − 0.096]), but had the
weakest effect size (g = − 0.370 [95% CI − 0.259, − 0.482]). This result is probably
due to the fact that respondents were less likely to express perceptions such as “I
often find myself objecting to the symbols of my country” or to disagree with the
core values that their home countries represent (see Table 3). Still, the prevalence of
these resistance perceptions was not negligible, with more than a third of respon-
dents expressing these views.
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Perceptions of procedural justice PJ Checklists led to improved perceptions of proce-
dural justice (b = 1.272 [95% CI 1.019, 1.525]), with a large effect size (g = 1.044 [95%
CI 0.930, 1.158]). The same findings and effect sizes were found for each of the four
dimensions that comprise this scale—voice, trustworthy motives, respect, and
impartiality—as well as for the procedural effectiveness variables. When using PJ
Checklists, officers are significantly more likely to introduce themselves to suspects
and to inform suspects of their legal status.
Discussion
The secrecy that characterizes counterterrorism limits the scope of experimental re-
search in this area of law enforcement (Lum et al. 2006). As noted previously, public
safety concerns in which valid estimates of intervention effects could prove beneficial
are precisely the situations in which evidence is scarce; this evidence paradox obstructs
any attempt to robustly test the effectiveness of these policies. However, this study was
able to produce some of the first rigorous evidence regarding whether it is possible to
Table 4 Effect of PJ Checklist on suspected terrorists’ ratings of legitimacy-related dimensions: regression
coefficients and effect sizes from multi-level linear, logistic, and ordered logit regression models (N=65
clusters)
Variable Coefficient 95%
CI lower
95%
CI upper
SEa p value ICC Sample
size
Effect size (95% CI)
Procedural justice 1.32 1.04 1.60 0.14 < 0.001b .108 1363 g = 1.044 (0.930, 1.158)
Impartiality/neutrality 1.16 0.91 1.42 0.13 < 0.001b .068 1375 g = 1.031 (0.918, 1.145)
Respect 1.31 1.02 1.60 0.15 < 0.001b .114 1363 g = 1.024 (0.910, 1.137)
Trustworthy motives 1.36 1.07 1.65 0.15 < 0.001b .091 1389 g = 1.001 (0.888, 1.113)
Voice 1.34 1.06 1.63 0.15 < 0.001b .104 1375 g = 0.873 (0.761, 0.984)
Officer introduced
himself c
2.71 2.12 3.29 0.30 < 0.001 .175 1323 ORd = 14.97 (8.35, 26.86)
Officer explained what
legislation is usedc
2.54 1.96 3.11 0.29 < 0.001 .170 1333 ORd = 12.62 (7.08, 22.50)
Perceived length of
interrogatione)
− 0.22 − 0.66 0.22 0.22 0.326 n/a 1400 ORd = 0.80 (0.52, 1.24)
Distributive justice 1.16 0.92 1.40 0.12 < 0.001 .095 1375 g = 0.993 (0.880, 1.106)
Effectiveness 1.20 0.97 1.43 0.12 < 0.001 .100 1287 g = 1.077 (0.959, 1.195)
Obligation to obey
the law
1.35 1.08 1.62 0.14 < 0.001 .108 1294 g = .022 (0.905, 1.138)
Cooperation
with the police
1.21 0.98 1.44 0.12 < 0.001 .118 1262 g = 1.118 (0.999, 1.238)
Social resistance − 0.26 − 0.42 − 0.11 0.08 < 0.001 .068 1287 g = − 0.370 (− 0.259,
− 0.482)
a Adjusted for clustering and using robust SEs
b Bonferonni threshold for “significance” adjusted for five tests would be 0.01—all reported p values < 0.001
c Logistic regression coefficient
d OR = odds ratio
e Ordered logit model
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change the behavior of officers conducting counterterrorism interviews. This is a
crucial turning point in the development of evidence-led policymaking in counter-
terrorism (Sanderson 2002; Sherman 2013). Our experiment illustrates that rigorous
impact evaluations in this extremely sensitive area of criminal justice policy are
possible, and we hope that replications and follow-up research will be conducted in
the future to further assess the results presented here.
Procedural justice is a key component of police legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe
2012, 2017). We have shown here that PJ checklists offer a simple, scalable means of
improving how state agents interact with suspected terrorists. The police can enhance
people’s obligation to obey counterterrorism laws and improve the flow of information,
even in a counterterrorism environment, with what is seemingly a cost-effective tool: a
checklist that takes very little time to complete. A straightforward reminder to treat
suspects in accordance with the tenets of fairness, dignity, equality, and respect has
resulted in large effects, in the magnitude of more than an entire standard deviation
from the control group. We found improvements in every dimension measured.
Specifically, terrorism suspects were given more information about their interrogation,
were allowed to voice their concerns, were treated equally in comparison to other
suspects, and reported higher overall legitimacy scores compared with control condi-
tions. The checklist altered how suspects perceive both the “local” interaction with
specific counterterrorism officers and “global” dimensions of counterterrorism policies.
Previous studies that sought to increase police legitimacy resulted in relatively
modest effect sizes for procedural justice (Mazerolle et al. 2013b). The effect sizes
reported in the present paper are substantially larger. This difference can be interpreted
in two ways: methodological and theoretical. To our knowledge, this is the first cluster
randomized trial in this area of research. Using a cluster-randomized design overcomes
many of the threats to internal validity that occur in other randomized controlled trial
designs (Ariel et al. 2018). For example, minimizing contamination through design
means that we have avoided problems that have affected other PJ experiments—e.g.,
the same officers being in both treatment and control conditions (Langley 2014;
Mazerolle, Antrobus, et al., 2013). Through minimizing this particular threat to validity,
a cleaner treatment/control comparison is possible.
Second, and more conceptually (but with a clear implication for public policy),
procedural justice is important in every type of law-enforcement procedure (Nagin and
Telep 2017a; Tyler et al. 2014), specifically when dealing with individuals suspected of
terrorism. Participants in this study experienced what must have been an emotionally
and psychologically intense event. In the control group, the overall scores were far from
“positive perceptions.” For example, as shown in Table 3, the non–PJ Checklist group
expressed overall negative views; without the checklist, most suspects did not perceive
the interrogation as fair or legitimate. We can only speculate as to how such negative
experiences with the police are reported in the interviewee’s community, thereby
perpetuating a vicious cycle of perceived illegitimacy (Skogan 2006). However, once
the officers were “nudged” to be more procedurally just, suspects subsequently reported
these interactions as more fair, just, and effective.
Democracies have the inalienable right to defend themselves to the fullest extent of
the law. At the same time, however, even in the context of counterterrorism and
extremism, societies should not look the other way when fundamental human and legal
rights risk being sidetracked in the name of safety and security (Zedner 2003). As the
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police often rely on the public to report threats or cooperate with counterterrorism
efforts, the police need to be viewed as wielding their state-bestowed powers legiti-
mately (Hough et al. 2010). As such, it seems sensible to conduct interviews with
terrorism suspects in a way that engenders the highest possible levels of perceived
fairness and procedurally just conduct. Failing to do so means that the rights of
innocent citizens may be routinely violated (Luban 2002), which may in turn affect
wider community perceptions of police and policing legitimacy (Tyler 2012). While we
have no evidence that a PJ Checklist policy leads to more general legitimacy, mani-
fested as more cooperation or less extremism (see Nagin and Telep 2017b), this does
not mean that the goal of changing perception is unimportant. 2 Legitimacy is one of the
“ultimate values” by which policing is judged, and it creates a potential “cushion of
support” for police in times of difficulty, such as terrorist attacks (Rasinski et al. 1985).
If treated unfairly, why would communities cooperate? If counterterrorism interroga-
tions apply extreme measures and violate human rights, who would dare report a
suspect? These very tactics can drive some elements into extremism, in what can only
be viewed as a backfire of a counterterrorism policy (Chalk 2017). Our study shows
that a simple checklist may make a disproportionately large contribution to enhancing a
range of perception associated with legitimacy in one of the earliest phases of the
counterterrorism interview process.
Given the evidence presented here, a practical policy implication can be identified:
incorporating a PJ Checklist should be part and parcel of counterterrorism policing’s
standard operating procedure. The approach is inexpensive, and the PJ Checklist can be
adapted for and tested in other jurisdictions, practices, or needs. We would also argue
that if checklists are useful for counterterrorism, they are likely to be valuable in other
contentious law-enforcement encounters: stop-and-accounts, searches, and criminal
interviews more broadly. However, replications, preferably in diverse samples, are still
required to confirm this.
At the same time, if officers will not adhere to the code of practice which serves as
the foundation for the PJ Checklist, and if line managers will not interject when the
checklists do not serve their purpose, the PJ Checklist policy will be “toothless” (Ariel
2012). An organizationally-led implementation policy is necessary for the rules to be
followed systematically and continuously, with clear guidelines for taking steps to deal
with non-compliance (Fixsen et al. 2009).
A PJ Checklist is not a salve for egregious violations of suspects’ human rights. In
places where outright torture is practiced, a policy of ticking boxes will not matter much.
However, our study takes place in a European democracy that, broadly speaking, has a
demonstrated record of securing human rights, like most of the developed The Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) countries. It remains true
that, in similar countries, a constant clash exists between security needs and securing
human rights (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011; Merin et al. 2015; Newheiser and DeMarco
2018). The counterterrorism code of practice expresses this dilemma, but it still requires
that suspects be treated fairly. It turns out that officers need to be reminded to follow these
2 We concluded that the treatment measures the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures; however, we had
no measures on the security outcomes—i.e., the false positive or negative identification of terrorists—resulting
from the interrogations. We did not have access to these data points from the security services. Future research
should attempt to provide non-perceptual consequences of the treatment effects.
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rules, just like pilots, surgeons, and engineers. Therefore, for security agencies that express
a genuine concern for due process, a little checklist can go a long way.
Notwithstanding these findings, we are cognizant that one of, if not the most, important
pieces of the puzzle is missing: We did not have the opportunity to test actual cooperation
with the police in its counterterrorism mission (see Nagin and Telep 2017a, as well as The
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018, on proactive policing
for a broader critique).We have at least been able to show improvements in thewillingness
of those who interact with counterterrorism officers to act upon the tested reflections.
Differences from control participants were not negligible, and treatment participants
expressed a greater willingness to report various terrorism-related activities to the police,
including different threats to national security. As important as these perceptions are in
democratic societies (Tyler 2017), and notwithstanding the view that procedural justice
ought to be practiced inconsequentially to the question of tangible benefits (Nagin and
Telep 2017b), there is no evidence linking the PJ Checklist to behavioral manifestations.
We did not gain access to operational intelligence data that links those who underwent a PJ
Checklist treatment (or control conditions) to future reporting of any crime to the police or
the counterterrorism information hotline. Future controlled tests in police legitimacy
research ought to delve into these potential benefits in greater depth.
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